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This thesis studies an evolutionary model with stochastic stability of Kandori, 
Mailath, and Rob (1993) (KMR) with time-dependent mutation rates (cf. Robles, 
1998; Pak, 2008). While the original model of KMR is time-homogeneous, the 
focus of Robles (1998) and Pak (2008) is on the limiting distribution of plays 
in time-inlioinogeneous model. Pak (2008) provides a sufficient condition on the 
rate of convergence of the mutation parameter for ergodicity. He shows that 
the limiting distribution is the same as KMR's long-run distribution when the 
mutation parameter converges to zero slowly enough. 
Ill this thesis, we mainly focus on the empirical distribution of plays. In 
particular, we provide a sufficient condition for the empirical distribution to con-
verge to KMR's long-run distribution almost surely. We prove that when the 
mutation parameter converges to zero slowly enough, KMR's long-run distribu-
tion describes not only the probability distribution over the states but also the 
portion of time that the system spends on each state. This complements Pak's 
(2008) ergodicity results. 
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Nash Equilibrium has been widely treated as a solution or a prediction of out-
comes ill Game Theory (cf. Nash, 1951; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). 
However, it fails to give a precise prediction when there are multiple Nash Equi-
libria. Game theorists have tried to tackle the problem by refining the Nash 
Equilibrium concept. They show that some of the Nash Equilibria are more rea-
sonable to be selected (cf. van Damme, 1987; Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Perfect 
equilibrium (cf. Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (cf. Myersori, 1978) are 
typical examples of such refinements. They capture the ideas that the game is 
played by fully rational players with some small irrational perturbations or that 
the players tremble when they make their decisions. The concept of stochastic 
stability (cf. Foster and Young, 1990; Kandori, Mailath and Rob, 1993; Young, 
1993) is another example of equilibrium refinement concept. It captures the ideas 
that the game is played by some boundedly rational players who may make er-
rors during the play or that the players are programmed to play the game and 
experiment every once in a while. 
Different from the perfect equilibrium and proper equilibrium concepts, which 
focus on the one-shot game, the concept of stochastic stability studies the long-run 
behavior. It can occur that using the concepts of perfect equilibrium or proper 
equilibrium does not yield any refinement when there are multiple strict (hence, 
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strict pure) Nash Equilibria, because every strict Nash Equilibrium is perfect and 
proper. On the contrary, using stochastic stability as an equilibrium refinement 
can deal with multiple strict Nash Equilibria, and some of the equilibria dominate 
to occur in the long run in the presence of continual small stochastic shocks. In 
this chapter, we will first briefly introduce the concept of stochastic stability and 
mention some of its applications in different economic aspects. Then, we will 
provide a summary of this thesis. 
1.1 Stochastic Stability 
The concept of stochastic stability (which was introduced by Foster and Young 
(1990)) is a concept concerning the stability of Nash Equilibrium in the presence 
of continual stochastic perturbations. Roughly speaking, a state X is a Stochas-
tically Stable Equilibrium (SSE) if, in the long run, it is nearly certain that the 
system lies within every small neighborhood of X as the noise (or perturbation) 
tends slowly to zero (cf. Foster and Young, 1990). While the concept of stochastic 
stability is of an evolutionary approach, it differs from the concept of Evolution-
arily Stable Strategy (ESS) i (which was introduced by Maynard Smith and Price 
(1973)) in the way that the concept of ESS does not capture the notion of long-run 
stability when the system is subjected to stochastic effects continually. Instead, 
it treats each perturbation as if it were an isolated event. 
Subsequently, the concept of stochastic stability was developed more fruit-
fully by the pioneering work of Kaiidori, Mailath and Rob (1993) (henceforth 
KMR) (cf. Young, 1993). In this thesis, we follow the evolutionary model based 
on KMR's framework. KMR consider a discrete framework of an evolutionary 
learning process and focus on 2 x 2 symmetric games. Their evolutionary frame-
work can easily be extended to more general games. Ellison (2000) provides a 
1 Roughly speaking, an ESS is a strategy such that if most of the members of a population 
adopt it, then no mutant strategy can invade. 
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general formulation for KMR's model. Our homogeneous model of evolution, 
which will be defined in Chapter 5, is adapted from Ellison (2000)'s generalized 
version of KMR's evolutionary model. 
KMR's approach prevails over that of Foster and Young (1990) in the sense 
that KMR's prediction only depends on the payoff structure of the game, but the 
prediction of Foster and Young (1990) also depends on additional details of the 
dynamics such as the speed of adjustment.2 We will describe KMR's approach 
in detail in Chapter 2. 
1.2 Some Examples 
KMR's approach has been applied to study a variety of economic problems. The 
following are a few examples of the existing literature. 
Example 1 Oligopoly (Vega-Redondo (1997)) 
Vega-Redondo considers a Cournot model of n firms producing a homogeneous 
good in an evolutionary framework. Instead of assuming firms' decision on the 
output quantity is profit maximizing, Vega-Redondo assumes that in each period, 
firms imitate the most successful firm's output choice according to last period's 
performance, and with probability £ > 0, firms also experiment other output 
choices. He shows that Walrasian behavior emerges in the stochastically stable 
state. 
Example 2 Mobility (Blume and Ternzelides (2003)) 
Blurrie and Ternzelides study an evolutionary model in which heterogeneous 
bouridedly rational agents differing in their mobility interact locally to play a 
coordination game. Similar to KMR, Blume and Ternzelides introduce stochastic 
perturbations into the system by assuming that with probability e > 0, each 
2 A detailed description of the differences between their models can be found in KMR, 
p.33&51-53. 
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player trembles and chooses an action from a full support distribution. They 
show that mobile agents, who are able to relocate within a country, enjoy a 
higher payoff and always benefit from increased country size, whereas immobile 
agents benefit from increased country size only when the country size is small. 
Example 3 Double Auction (Agastya (2004)) 
Agastya characterizes the stochastically stable equilibrium in a "'-double auc-
tion.^ He finds that the stochastically stable equilibrium price is of the lowest risk 
potential, which in fact approximates an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution 
with seller's bargaining power being 1 — k. Since seller's bargaining power (and 
hence the stochastically stable equilibrium price) is decreasing in k, the long-run 
payoff of the seller is also decreasing in k. This contrasts with the short-run 
payoff (in one-shot game) of the seller, which is increasing in k. 
Example 4 Networking (Jackson and Watts (2002)) 
Jackson and Watts develop a model of the dynamic formation of non-direct 
networks and characterize the stochastically stable networks. They find that a 
stochastically stable network is either pairwise stable or part of a closed cycle. 
They then extend to the case that allows simultaneous improvement and define 
the S'-stochastically stable networks. They apply this solution concept to the Gale 
and Shapley (1962) marriage problem and show that the set of S'-stochastically 
stable networks coincides with the set of core stable networks. 
There are many different variations of KMR's approach, such as the follow-
ing: state-dependent mutations in Bergin and Lipman (1996), locally interactive 
learning system in Anderlini and lanni (1996), literally random matching mecha-
nism and realized average payoff in Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996), and time-
^In a fc-double auction, exchange of an indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is 
at least as high as the ask, and the trading price being the bid with probability k and the ask 
with probability 1 - k. 
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dependent mutations in Robles (1998) and Pak (2008). For details, see Section 
2.2. 
1.3 Our Main Focus 
The main focus of this thesis is on the evolutionary model with stochastic stability 
of KMR with time-dependent mutations (cf. Robles, 1998; Pak, 2008). As agents 
repeat a game, they should become more certain of their environment and their 
predictions on opponent's action, and hence less likely to experiment or make 
mistakes. This motivates the study of time-inhomogeneous model of evolution 
where the mutation rate converges to zero. 
Our main contribution is that we study the convergence problem for the em-
pirical distribution of plays of such model. Empirical distribution is commonly 
used to make predictions in the literature of Game Theory. For instance, Foster 
and Vohra (1997), Fudenberg and Levine (1999), and Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) 
obtain adaptive procedures that lead the empirical distribution of plays to con-
verge to the set of correlated equilibria. Also, empirical distribution is used to 
update beliefs in fictitious play in learning models,^ and is used for forecasting in 
calibrated learning. 5 
Our main result is in Chapter 5, where our model is specified and the re-
sult is presented. In our main theorem (Theorem 5.2.1), we provide a sufficient 
4 Nash Equilibrium is a steady state in which each player plays a best response to each other 
players' actions. This raises the question of how the players form correct beliefs about the other 
players' actions. One explanation is that each player starts with an unexplained "prior" belief 
about the other players' actions, and changes his/her belief by learning. One model of learning 
is fictitious play, in which players play best responses to the empirical distribution of plays 
observed so far (cf. Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). In fictitious 
play, players have a prior belief about the other players' actions before the play of the game. 
They then repeatedly play the game, and use the empirical distribution as a prediction of other 
players' next move and best respond to it. This kind of learning is on the individual level, 
which is in contrast to the evolutionary models (which focus on the aggregate level of learning, 
see footnote 3 in Chapter 2). 
5 Cf. Young, 2004，Chapter 5; Foster and Vohra, 1997, 1998, 1999. 
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condition on the rate of convergence of the mutation parameter for the empirical 
distribution to converge to KMR's long-run distribution almost surely. Our result 
complements the existing results on ergodicity (Pak, 2008, Theorem 3.9; Robles, 
1998，Proposition 4.3)，showing that when the mutation parameter converges to 
zero slowly enough, KMR's long-run distribution describes not only the proba-
bility distribution over the states but also the portion of time that the system 
spends on each state. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents KMR's approach 
in detail and some of its variations. Chapter 3 is a mathematical review on 
nonstationary (or time-inhomogeneous) Markov chain. Some existing works on 
time-dependent mutation rates, in particular, Pak's (2008) model and results, 
will be given in Chapter 4. Our model and the main result of this thesis —— 
convergence of empirical distribution of plays — will be presented in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 presents some numerical results obtained from simulations. Chapter 
7 concludes. 
Chapter 2 
KMR's Approach and its 
Variations 
111 this chapter, we will first outline KMR's evolutionary framework and describe 
their approach in detail. Then, we will review several literature on some variations 
of their approach. 
2.1 KMR's Approach 
KMR develop a general technique to determine the so-called long run equilibrium 
(which is essentially the same concept as SSE).^ They show that in a 2 x 2 
syrnirietric coordination game, the long run equilibrium coincides with the risk 
dominant equilibrium, (which was proposed by Harsanyi and Selteri (1988)) even 
if it is Pareto inefficient. 
KMR's paper also sheds light on the growing literature on bounded rational-
ity and the process of learning. Actually, the evolutionary approach has the idea 
that players are boundedly rational instead of fully rational. The analysis in tra-
ditional game theory has been criticized on the assumption that all players have 
full rationality, including having infinite capability in computation to correctly 
anticipate the other players' choices, making its explanation and prediction un-
1 In the rest of this thesis, we use the two concepts interchangeably. 
7 
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realistic in practice (cf. Binmore, 1987, 1988). KMR's approach overcomes these 
deficiencies in a way that it can be interpreted as the players in a game having 
limited ability to receive, decode, and act upon the information they get in the 
course of play. The analysis of KMR's approach is based on the following three 
hypotheses on the players: 
(i) Inertia hypothesis: 
not all agents need to react instantaneously to their environment; 
(ii) Myopia hypothesis: 
when agents react, they react myopically; and 
(iii) Mutation, or experimentation hypothesis: 
there is a small probability that agents change their strategies at random. 
We can regard those players do not make decisions under full rationality, but 
their behavior is still justified as rational under certain circumstances. 
We now review KMR's model. For simplicity, we focus on 2 x 2 symmetric 
games (of course, our main results are in the general framework (cf. Ellision, 
2000) allowing any finite games). Consider the following 2 x 2 symmetric game: 
I A I B 
A a, a 6, c 
B c, b d,d 
Suppose there are N players who are going to play the game, and actions are 
taken in discrete time t = 1 , 2 ’ — Let St be the number of players adopting 
strategy A at time t. This defines the states of the dynamical system where the 
state space is 二 {0，1,…，iV}. Assume that ni{st), the average payoff of a player 
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using strategy i in period t, is given by ^ 
- 养 台 � + € � a n d 
,、 s N-s-1 ^ 网 
KMR only requires a very weak assumption on the underlying deterministic (un-
perturbed) dynamics St+i = b{st) having the following "Darwinian" property: 
sigri{b(s) - s) = sign{'KA{s)—兀召⑷）for s 0’ •/V， (2.2) 
and b{0) > 0 if 7^(0) > 7rs(0) (and >^(0) = 0 if tt乂0) < 7rs(0))’ and b{N) < N 
if 7r^(7V) < - k b W (and h{N) = N \i n^N) > 7Tb{N)). The "Darwinian" 
property captures the idea that successful strategies are adopted more often than 
unsuccessful strategies.^ 
KMR introduce mutations (or perturbations) into the system by assuming 
that each player's strategy "flips" with fixed probability e > 0 in each period (i.i.d. 
across players and over time).4 This can be interpreted as each player experiments 
every once in a while with exogenously fixed probability. As mentioned before, 
KMR develop a general technique to determine the long run equilibrium. The 
trick is to use directed graphs which connect the states in the state space. This 
technique is originally from Preidlin and Wentzell (1984). KMR adapt it to 
their evolutionary framework and show that the long-iun distribution is totally 
2 KMR consider two matching mechanisms that generate the average payoffs in (2.1). The 
first mechanism is a round robin tournament, where each player confronts each other player 
exactly once within a period. The second mechanism involves an infinite number of random 
matches within a period, where each player's average payoff in that period is equal to the 
expected payoff. Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) propose a literally random matching mech-
anism and take the realized average payoff of each strategy as the average payoff. They obtain 
a result that is contrary to that of KMR. For more details, see Section 2.2.3. 
3 The "Darwinian" property can also be viewed as the population of players "learning" to 
adopt more successful strategies as they gain experience. 
4 Note that since the mutation rate e is fixed constant throughout the time, the induced 
Markov chain is stationary, which is in contrast to the nonstationary Markov chain (which will 
be discussed in Chapter 3). 
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determined by the relative size of the basins of attraction of the absorbing sets 
in the unperturbed dynamics. 
More specifically, let be the perturbed transition matrix over S with 
mutation rate e > 0. Since is strictly positive, an invariant distribution of 
P{£) exists and is unique. Denote it as j i � T h e invariant distribution /i^ has 
the following two properties: 
1. (Ergodicity Property) The stationary Markov process is ergodic, i.e., 
= l i i r i "o(尸⑷广， （2.3) 
K—>00 
where fio can be any initial distribution. 
2. (Strong-Law Property) The strong law of large numbers is satisfied: for any-
initial state So, 
T 
^ Xi(sf) / i e � almost surely as T oo (2.4) 
t=i 
for all i G 5, where Xi{st) = 1 if St = i, and Xi{st) = 0 otherwise. 
Ergodicity Property says that, as time goes to infinity, the probability distribution 
over the state space under the perturbed dynamics will converge to the invariant 
distribution /i^ regardless of the initial distribution. By Strong-Law Property, the 
invariant distribution fi^ can be interpreted as the portion of time that the system 
spends on each state in the perturbed dynamics, which in fact approximates the 
empirical distribution of plays when time t is large. Specifically, for each s G 5, 
let Hs be the set of s-trees.® KMR show that ^ 
咖 = (2.5) 
5 An invariant distribution of a transition matrix P is a probability distribution jx such that 
fiP = fi. 
6 A s-tree is a directed graph on S such that every s' G 5 \ { s } has exactly one successor and 
there are no closed loops. 
7 Cf. KMR, Lemma 1. 
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where q办) i s defined by 
Qs(s) = X] n 尸以'⑷. (2.6) 
hen., (s',s")€h 
The limit distribution (or long-run distribution) ju* = liirie—o Me exists, and its 
support is defined as the long run equilibrium. In this regard, fi* can be inter-
preted as the invariant distribution of the "mutationless" process that is robust 
to small perturbations in the transition probabilities. KMR's results can easily 
be extended to the more general games in which S can be any finite state space. 
In such cases, (2.3)-(2.6) are still valid. 
For a coordination game, i.e., a > c and d > b, Ei = {A, A) and E2 = (B, B) 
are strict Nash Equilibria. 8 We say Ei risk dominates E2 if a - c> d - b, and E2 
risk dominates Ei ii a - c < d - b.^ Let s* G M be the critical level of population 
such that sign{'KA{s) - 7rB(s)) = sign{s — s*).^^ The two states 0 and N have 
basins of attraction under b{-) given by {5 < s*} and {s > 5*}, respectively. The 
relative size of these basins of attraction is a crucial factor in the determination 
of the limit distribution. KMR show that the equilibrium with the larger basin 
of attraction will be selected in the long run. As a result, the evolution process 
will select the risk dominant equilibrium as the long run equilibrium even if it is 
Pareto inefficient. On the other hand, if the two equilibria Ei and E2 have the 
same security levels (i.e., b = c), then the unique long run equilibrium will be the 
Pareto efficient one. 
KMR's original model focuses on 2 x 2 symmetric games. It is obvious to 
extend to any symmetric finite games (cf. Kandori and Rob, 1995). In fact, 
Ellison (2000) provides a general formulation for KMR's model, requiring only 
the state space to be finite. 
8 And so, the absorbing sets of the unperturbed dynamics are {0} and {TV}. 
9 Cf. Harsanyi and Selten, 1988. 
By calculation, s* = [N{d - b) + a - d]/{a - c + d-b). 
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2.2 Variations 
The following are some of the many literature on the different variations of KMR's 
evolutionary model. These literature reexamine certain assumption(s) in KMR's 
model and propose some other possibilities. 
2.2.1 Bergin and Liprnan (1996) 
Bergin and Liprnan study an evolutionary model in which the mutation rate varies 
across states of the system but not across time. In KMR's model, the long-run 
behavior of the dynamical system with mutations is determined by the number of 
mutations it takes to force the system from one state to the other. The one which 
is more easily to be disrupted by mutations in this sense is given zero probability 
ill the long run as the mutation rate goes to zero. In Bergin and Lipman's model, 
since the mutation rates can be different in different states, even though one state 
is more robust than the other in terms of the number of mutations, it may be 
less robust in terms of the probability of these mutations. Bergin and Liprnan 
show that given any model of the effect of mutations, any invariant distribution 
of the "niutationless" process is close to an invariant distribution of the perturbed 
process with appropriately chosen small mutation rates. 
2.2.2 Anderlini and lanni (1996) 
Anderlini and lanni study the long-run properties of a class of locally interactive 
learning systems. They consider a finite set of players at fixed locations playing 
a 2 X 2 symmetric game with "strategic complementarities"，ii with one of their 
"neighbors" selected at random. In their model, mutation depends on the adjust-
ment process, namely, an agent cannot mutate unless he/she is already changing 
Here, "strategic complementarities" means that the expected payoff from playing a strategy 
increases with the probability that the opposing player plays that strategy. So, the games under 
consideration are 2 x 2 symmetric coordination games (with some more restrictions). 
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his/her strategy because of the "miitationless" adjustment process. This kind of 
noise, which they refer to as "noise at the margin", yields highly path-dependent 
behavior. Different from KMR's model, in which the system converges to the 
risk dominant equilibrium where all players take the same strategy, Anderlini 
and laiiiii's locally interactive model makes both strategies can survive in the 
long run. 
2.2.3 Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) 
Robson and Vega-Redondo incorporate a literally random matching mechanism 
into KMR's evolutionary model. In KMR's model, the revision of strategies 
is based on the expected payoff of each strategy. Robson and Vega-Redondo 
modify this assumption by making the strategy revision based on the realized 
average payoff obtained by each strategy. As a result, the noise of the system 
includes not only that from independent mutations but also that arises from 
random matching during the adjustment process. Robson and Vega-Redondo 
show that in the class of 2 x 2 symmetric coordination games, the Pareto efficient 
equilibrium is selected rather than the risk dominant equilibrium in the long run, 
which is in contrast to KMR's result. 
2.2.4 Robles (1998) and Pak (2008) 
Robles and Pak study the tirne-inhomogeneous model of evolution, in which the 
mutation rate varies over time. Robles considers the robustness of the long run 
equilibrium in KMR's model when the mutation rate is time-dependent. He fo-
cuses on the case where the mutation rate declines to zero monotonically. The 
decline of the mutation rate can be justified by considering that as agents re-
peat a game, they should become more certain of their environment and their 
predictions of opponents' play, and hence less likely to experiment or make mis-
takes. Since the transition probabilities now vary over time, a nonstationary (or 
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time-inhomogeneous) Markov chain is resulted and the ergodicity of each period's 
Markov matrix defined in the mutation process cannot guarantee that the result-
ing time-inhomogeneous system has a limiting distribution as in KMR's model. 
Robles shows that as long as the mutation rate declines to zero slowly enough, 
the tiine-inhorriogeiieous system has a limiting distribution which coincides with 
KMR's long-riin distribution. 
Pak extends Robles' results to any finite state space Markov model, including 
those with periodic cycles, whose transition probabilities of the perturbed system 
are approximately polynomial functions of the mutation parameter.^^ He shows 
that Robles' condition is not sufficient for the time-inhomogeneous system to have 
a limiting distribution when the minimum "coradius" set has periodic cycles. In 
such case, the mutation rate needs to decline even more slowly. A more detailed 
description of Pak's model and his results will be given in Chapter 4. 
12 Actually, the transition probabilities are of some special kinds of Lipschitz continuous 
functions, and the mutation rate needs not to decrease monotonically but only needs to converge 
to zero. 
Chapter 3 
Mathematical Reviews on 
Nonstationary Markov Chain 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Robles (1998) and Pak (2008) study evolutionary 
models in which the mutation rate is time-dependent. As a result, the transition 
probabilities vary over time and a nonstationar-y (or time-inhomogeneous) Markov 
chain is resulted, i.e., a Markov chain in which the Markov matrix in each period 
depends on the period time. In this chapter, we will review some existing results 
on nonstationary Markov chain, which are drawn from Isaacson and Madseri 
(1976). These results have been used by Robles (1998) and Pak (2008) in their 
models concerning time-dependent mutation rates. These results are also useful 
for our model. 
Section 3.1 will introduce the ergodic coefficient. Then, two concepts regarding 
ergodicity of nonstationary Markov chain — weak ergodicity and strong ergodicity 
—wil l be discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
3.1 Ergodic Coefficient 
We study the behavior of the dynamic system throughout period t = 0,1，2，... 
over a finite state space S with = mJ Let be the transition matrix 
1 Note that Isaacson and Madsen (1976) allow the state space to be countably infinite, but 
we restrict to the case of finite state space only. 
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of t h e n o i i s t a t i o n a r y M a r k o v c h a i n f r o m t i m e t t o t i m e t'. A m a t r i x Q is constant 
if a l l of i t s r o w s a r e i d e n t i c a l . D e f i n e t h e ergodic coefficient a s fo l lows: 
D e f i n i t i o n 3 . 1 . 1 Let Q be a transition matrix. The ergodic coefficient (or delta 
coefficient尸 of Q，denoted by 6{Q), is defined by 
S(Q) := 1 - m i l l ^ m i r i { Q s s " ’ Q s ' s " } - (3 .1) 
SxS 
s"es 
T h e f o l l o w i n g t w o l e m m a s g ive s o m e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of t h e d e l t a coe f f i c i en t :^ 
L e m m a 3 . 1 . 1 For any transition matrix Q， 
0 < 6{Q) < 1’ (3.2) 
and, for any two transition matrices Qi and Q2, 
S{QiQ2) < 6iQ,)6(Q2). (3.3) 
L e m m a 3 . 1 . 2 If P is a transition matrix, R is any matrix with rik = 0 
for all i, and ||i?||oo < oo，4 then 
尸Hoc < \\R\U{P). (3.4) 
3.2 Weak Ergodicity 
F o r a n o i i s t a t i o n a r y M a r k o v c h a i n t o h a v e a l i m i t i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n , i t m u s t n e c e s -
s a r i l y h a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o p r o p e r t i e s : loss of memory p r o p e r t y a n d convergence 
2 is only one of the examples of a proper coefficient of ergodicity in Seneta (1981), and 
is called the delta coefficient in Isaacson and Madseii (1976). In the rest of this thesis, we use 
the two terms interchangeably, meaning the 5{-) defined in (3.1). 
3 See Isaacson and Madsen (1976), Lemmas V.2.3 and V.2.4. These two lemmas will be 
used repeatedly in the proof of Theorem 5.2.1 in Chapter 5. 
4 We denote 丨丨.丨丨 as the Euclidean norm of a 1 x m vector, || • ||i as the l-norm of a 1 x m 
vector, and || . ||oo as the oo-norm of an m x m matrix throughout this thesis, i.e., given a 
vector u = (wOt^ii and a matrix A = (aij)�j-=i，||w|| = V E i = i IMIi = E二11叫I and 
I I^IU = m a x i < i < ^ E ^ i l«ijl-
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property. Loss of memory property refers to the property that as time goes on, 
the final probability distribution over the state space becomes less and less depen-
dent on the initial distribution and when time goes to infinity, it becomes totally 
independent of the initial distribution. This property can also be viewed as the 
meaning of weak ergodicity. More precisely, we have the following definition:^ 
D e f i n i t i o n 3 . 2 . 1 A nonstationary Markov chain is weakly ergodic if for any t 
and any initial distributions fo and go, 
lini 卯 丨 | i = 0. (3.5) 
r—•oo 
Equivalently，6 a nonstationary Markov chain is weakly ergodic if for any t and 
any s, s" e S, 
(3.6) 
The following theorem relates the delta coefficient to weak ergodicity:? 
T h e o r e m 3 . 2 . 1 A nonstationary Markov chain is weakly ergodic if and only if 
for any t, 
^(p(M')) _ 0 as t' — oo. (3.7) 
The following theorem provides a sufficient and necessary condition for yield-
ing weak ergociicity:8'9 
5 See Isaacson and Madsen (1976), Definition V.1.3. 
6 See Pak (2008), Definition 3.1’ or Seneta (1981), Definition 4.4. 
7 See Isaacson and Madsen (1976), Theorem V.3.1. 
8 See Pak (2008), Theorem 3.3’ or Isaacson and Madsen (1976), Theorem V.3.2. 
9 One application of Theorem 3.2.2 is in the study of time-dependent mutation rates in 
time-inhoinogeneous model of evolution (cf. Robles, 1998; Pak, 2008). See Lemma 4.2.1 and 
its sketch of proof. 
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T h e o r e m 3 . 2 . 2 A nonstationary Markov chain is weakly ergodic if and only if 
there exists a strictly increasing sequence of positive integers {tk ： A; = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . }, 
with to = 0, such that 
oo 
幻 ) ) ） = oo. (3.8) 
k=0 
3.3 Strong Ergodicity 
Although weak ergodicity requires the nonstationary Markov chain to eventually 
forget its initial condition, it does not require the chain's long-run behavior to 
actually converge. If in addition to the loss of memory property, the chain's long-
run behavior also has the convergence property, then the nonstationary Markov 
chain is said to be strongly ergodic. The precise definition of strong ergodicity is 
as follows: 10 
D e f i n i t i o n 3 . 3 . 1 A nonstationary Markov chain is strongly ergodic if there ex-
ists a vector q = (gi,...，q^), with | |g||i = 1 and Qi > 0 for all i = 1 , . . . , m, such 
that for any t and any initial distribution /〇, 
Jim | | /oP(�") —(/||i = 0. (3.9) 
r—»oo 
Equivalently/1 a nonstationary Markov chain is strongly ergodic if there exists a 
probability distribution q on S such that for any t and any s, s' G S, 
lim P^lP = q,,. (3.10) 
Strong ergodicity is also equivalent to having the transition matrix to 
converge to some constant matrix, which can be seen in the following theorem:^^ 
� See Isaacson and Madsen (1976), Definition V.1.4. 
11 See Pak (2008), Definition 3.2. 
12 See Isaacson and Madsen (1976), Theorem V.4.1. 
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T h e o r e m 3 . 3 . 1 A nonstationary Markov chain is strongly ergodic if and only if 
there exists a constant matrix Q such that for any t, 
lirn | | P ( " ' ) - Q | | o o = 0. (3 .11) 
t'-*oo 
T h e fo l lowing t h e o r e m p r o v i d e s a su f f i c i en t c o n d i t i o n fo r y i e l d i n g s t r o n g e r -
godic i ty : i3’ i4 
T h e o r e m 3 . 3 . 2 A weakly ergodic nonstationary Markov chain is strongly er-
godic if for any t, there exists an invariant distribution fjM) of such that 
oo 
[ | | " W - " ( ’ | i < o o . (3 .12) 
<=0 
Moreover, if Q is the constant matrix with each row equal to n = linif—oo"⑷，i5 
then for any t, 
l i m 11尸 d Q I 丨 oo = 0. (3 .13) 
t'—KX) 
13 See Pak (2008)，Theorem 3.8，or Isaacson and Madsen (1976)，Theorem V.4.3. 
14 Similar to Theorem 3.2.2, one application of Theorem 3.3.2 is in the study of time-
dependent mutation rates in time-inhomogeneous model of evolution (cf. Robles, 1998; Pak, 
2008). See Theorem 4.3.1 and its sketch of proof. 
15 Note that /j. = limt—oo)^� exists because by (3.12), { / ^ � } is Caucliy in norm. Note also 
that since all of the � ’ s have the property that their components are non-negative and add 
to one, n also has this property and so Q is a transition matrix. 
Chapter 4 
Existing Works on 
Time-Dependent Mutation Rates 
In this chapter, we will review Pak's (2008) model and his results. Section 4.1 will 
discuss Pak's (2008) homogeneous and inhomogeneous models of evolution and 
some definitions concerning the cojudius of absorbing sets (which was introduced 
by Ellison (2000)). Then, the main results of Pak (2008) — sufficient conditions 
for weak ergodicity and strong ergodicity — will be discussed in Sections 4.2 and 
4.3. 
4.1 Model and Definitions 
Pak (2008) adapts Ellison (2000),s generalized version of KMR's evolutionary 
model as follows: 
Definit ion 4.1.1 (Cf. Pak, 2008, Definition 2.1) A homogeneous model of 
evolution is a transition matrix P and a family of transition matrices {P(e) : e G 
(0, e]} on a finite set S such that 
1. P(e) is ergodic for all e G (O,^], 
2. lime—0 P(e) = P, and 
20 
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3. there exists a cost function c : SxS — Z + U { + o o } and a family of Lipschitz 
functions {fss'} on [0,^] such that i 
尸 ⑷ 二 A w 已 如 + � ) ’ (4.1) 
where kss' > 0 and fss'[£) —> 0 as £ — 0. 
We add an additional remark here: 
i) P represents the unperturbed transition matrix; 
ii) P{e) represents a perturbed transition matrix; 
iii) {fss'(-)} is a family of Lipschitz functions, which covers many cases; 
iv) c(s, s') is the cost of transition, it represents the least number of mutations 
needed for transitioning from s to s'; 
v) Pss' (£) converges to 0 with order of convergence c(s, s') (because / s s ' � — ^ 0 
as £ 0). 
Pak (2008) then considers a model of evolution in which the mutation rate 
is allowed to vary over time. Let e : Z+ (•，司 be a sequence converging to 
zero and let the transition from time t to time i + 1 be governed by P(e(t)). The 
sequence of transition matrices {P(e(t)) : t G Z+} defines a time-inhomogeneous 
(nonstationary) Markov chain on S where the transition matrix from time t to 
time t' is 二 ！！二丄尸(办)).Pak，s (2008) inhomogeneous model of evolution 
is defined as follows: 
Definit ion 4.1.2 (Cf. Pak, 2008, Definition 2.4) An inhomogeneous model 
of evolution derived from a homogeneous model of evolution (F , {P{£) : s G 
(0,6]}) is a sequence of transition matrices {P{e{t)) : t G C {P(e) : £ G 
(0,£]} such that e ⑴ 0 as t ^  oo. 
1 We denote Z+ = { 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . } and Z++ = { 1 , 2 , . . . } throughout this thesis. 
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Before going to Pak's (2008) results, we need the following definitions. Denote 
O as the standard Big-O notation, i.e., for any two real-valued functions /(•) and 
g(-) defined on a domain X C M, f(x) = 0{g(x)) means that there exists a 
constant K < oo such that \ f{x)\ < K\g(x)\ for all x £ X. Also denote Q as the 
Big-f] notation, i.e., f{x) = Q{g(x)) means that there exists a constant K < oo 
such that |/(a;)| > K\gix)\ for all a; G J^.^ 
Let {Ci, • • • , Cm} be the family of absorbing sets ^ for the unperturbed dy-
namics with transition matrix P. Then, the state space S can be partitioned 
uniquely as 5 = T U C i U • • • UCm, where T is transient. Define C u f l i Q . A 
path h from s to s' is a sequence { s i , … ,Sk} of elements in S such that si = s 




which represents the least number of mutations along path h. For any s, s' G 5, 
define the r'esistarice from s to s' as 
r(s，s') miri{r(/i) : /z is a path from s to s'}， (4.3) 
which represents the least number of mutations needed for transitioning from s 
to s'. For any s E S, define the coradius of {s} as 
Ci?({5}) :=maxr(s\s). (4.4) 
The coradius of {s} represents the maximum resistance incurred in transitioning 
to s from another state. For any s, s' G S and any integer n > 0, define the 
ri-resistance from s to as the ininimum cost of transitioning from s to s' in 
2 Suppose f{x),g{x) —> 0 as a; -> xq, then f { x ) — 0{g{x)) means f{x) needs to converge to 
zero faster than (or with the same speed as) g{x) does, and f { x ) = Q{g{x)) means f{x) needs 
to converge to zero as slowly as g{x) does or f { x ) cannot converge to zero faster than g{x) does. 
3 I.e., each Ci C S satisfies (i) P r {s t+ i e Cj|st G Ci} = 1’ and (i i) for any s,s' G Ci, 
= s'|st = s } > 0 for some k. 
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exactly n steps, i.e., 
r (6�s\ n) := min{r(/i) : /i is a path from s to s' with length n}. (4.5) 
For any s G C, define 
o;({s}) mill max r(s', s, n), (4.6) 
n>l s'eCm 
where Cm is the unique absorbing set containing s. Finally, define 7 as the 
minimum of the sum of coradius C/?({•}) and q;({-}) over C, i.e., 
7 mill CR({s}) + a{{s}). (4.7) 
4.2 Sufficient Condition for Weak Ergodicity 
Pak's (2008) sufficient condition for weak ergodicity requires the sequence of 
mutation rate {e(力)}压to converge to zero slowly enough. More precisely, Pak 
(2008) requires {€{t)}tez+ to satisfy 
e ( t ) , - � ) , (S) 
where 7 is defined in (4.7). Pak's (2008) result is stated as follows: 
Lemma 4.2.1 (Cf. Pak, 2008, Lemma 3.5) Suppose e : Z+ 一 (0,e] is such 
that e{t) 0 as t —> 00 and e{t) = Then the Markov chain induced by 
the inhomogeneous model of evolution is weakly ergodic. 
Sketch of P roo f Pak (2008) applies Theorem 3.2.2 in his proof. Pak (2008) 
shows that under the specified condition on {e(t)}tez+，there exists an integer L 
and a constant K such that, as /c —> 00, 
> X ( i ) . (4.8) 
rZ 
Then, by choosing tk = kL, (3.8) is obtained and hence the nonstationary Markov 
chain is weakly ergodic. 
Q.E.D. 
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4.3 Sufficient Condition for Strong Ergodicity 
Pak (2008) applies Theorem 3.3.2 in showing a sufficient condition for strong 
ergodicity. Hence, to guarantee the induced nonstationary Markov chain to be 
weakly ergodic, Pak (2008) still requires the sequence of mutation rate {e{t)}tqz+ 
to satisfy condition (S). Moreover, Pak (2008) also requires {€{t)}t£z+ to have 
finite variation, i.e.,^ 
oo 
J2(e{t + l)-e(t)y<oo. (C) 
t=o 
Condition (C) can be viewed as an absolute continuity property for {e{t)}tez+-^ 




Obviously, X；二。|e(t+ 1) — e � | < oo implies E 二 (亡 + 1 ) _ ^ � ) + < � . H e n c e , 
conditions (C) and (4.9) are equivalent. Pak (2008) obtains the following result: 
Theorem 4.3.1 (Cf. Pak, 2008, Theorem 3.9) Suppose e : Z+ ^ (0,£； 
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4-2.1. Suppose further- that 艺 + 1)— 
< oo. Then the Markov chain induced by the inhomogeneous model of 
evolution is strongly ergodic. Moreover, for any t, 
lim � = 0 ’ （E) 
t'-^oo 
where Q* is the KM Ft-constant matrix.^ 
Sketch of P roo f Pak (2008) applies Theorem 3.3.2 in his proof. Pak (2008) 
shows that the invariant distribution of P{e{t)) is Lipschitz continuous in e{t). 
4 For real number a, we denote (a)+ = inax{a, 0}. 
5 Note that condition (C) restricts the fluctuations in the mutation rate {e{t)}tez+- It is 
automatically satisfied if { e � } i s monotonically decreasing. 
®I.e., the constant matrix with each row equal to KMR's limit distribution fi*. 
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Then, under the specified condition on {e(力)}托(3.12) is satisfied and hence the 
nonstationary Markov chain is strongly ergodic. Furthermore, as liirif—� A ^ � = 
(E) is obtained. 
Q.E.D. 
Equivalently, Theorem 4.3.1 says that for any inhomogeneous model of evo-
lution { P ( e � ) : t e Z+}’ if satisfies conditions (S) and (C), then for 
any t, 
H* = lirn //oP(《)， （E') 
t'—oo 
where /io can be any initial probability distribution. (E') can be viewed as the 
tirne-iiihornogeneous version of the Ergodicity Property (2.3). It says that re-
gardless of the initial probability distribution over the state space, as the length 
of the transition period goes to infinity, the probability distribution at the last 
period converges to KMR's limit distribution fi*. This means that the probabil-
ity distribution over the states after any large time periods is very close to fi* 
irrespective of the initial condition. 
Chapter 5 
Time-Dependent Mutations and 
Empirical Distribution 
The analysis of stochastic stability introduced by KMR comprises two steps. 
First, a small fixed mutation rate £ is introduced into an adaptive adjustment 
process over a finite state space. This e-pertiirbed process is a stationary (or 
time-homogeneous) Markov process, and thus has a unique invariant probability 
distribution j i � Second, the long-run distribution (or limit distribution) fi* is 
yielded by taking the limit of � a s £ goes to zero. For each mutation rate e, the 
empirical distribution of plays converges to /j,£ almost surely, and the distribution 
/i£ is interpreted as the portion of time that the system spends on each state. As 
KMR's limit distribution {i* is the limit of /i^, it describes the long-run behavior 
of the system when the mutation rate e is small. In using KMR's method to 
make predictions over the long run, one should be aware of that it is implicitly 
assumed that there is always some but positive mutation rate e in the system 
and that it is constant over time. Moreover, KMR's limit distribution fi* only 
approximates the limit of the empirical distribution, as the true limit is ii^. 
Robles (1998) and Pak (2008) modify KMR's framework by combining the 
two aforementioned steps into one. They use a sequence of time-dependent mu-
tation rates e � converging to zero, and study the limiting behavior of the re-
26 
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suiting nonstationary (or time-inhomogeneous) Markov process. Their focus is 
on the transitional probabilities with varying transition period lengths. They 
provide conditions on the mutation rate e⑴，which ensure that the nonstation-
ary Markov process satisfies the property of strong ergodicity: regardless of the 
initial probability distribution over the state space, as the length of the transition 
period goes to infinity, the probability distribution at the last period converges to 
KMR's limit distribution This means that the probability distribution over 
the states after any large time periods is very close to /z*. 
A time-dependent mutation rate is an interesting extension to study. First, 
in KMR's model the assumption that the mutation rate is constant over time is 
unrealistic. We claim that the mutation rate should be generally decreasing but 
with some fluctuations. The supporting arguments of our claim is as follows: 
(i) As agents repeat a game, they should become used to playing the game, 
and hence less likely to make mistakes. 
(ii) As agents repeat a game, they should become more certain of their erivi-
i.omiient and their predictions of opponents' play, and hence experiment 
less. 
These two arguments support the general declining pattern of the mutation rate. 
(iii) There are changes to the opponents or environment in some situations. 
Hence, there should be some fluctuations in the mutation rate over time. 
Second, if we can show that the time-dependent case also supports KMR's limit 
distribution /i*, then the prediction of KMR's long run equilibrium (i.e., SSE) is 
more robust. Third, the time-dependent case provides a generalization to KMR's 
model. Lastly, the time-dependent case is more realistic than KMR's model. For 
instance, in Example 1 Oligopoly and Example 2 Mobility in Section 1.2，it is 
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more reasonable to assume the mutation rate (i.e., the probability e) to be time-
dependent. The model with time-dependent mutation rates fits better in these 
practical examples than the original KMR's model. 
In this chapter, we follow the model of Robles (1998) and Pak (2008), but 
study the dynamic behavior of the empirical distribution of plays. Section 5.1 
specifies our model. Our main result and the proofs will be presented in Sections 
5.2 and 5.3. We seek a condition on the mutation rate e � that is sufficient 
for the property of the strong law of large numbers: the empirical distribution of 
plays converges almost surely. We strengthen the conditions of Robles (1998) and 
Pak (2008) by requiring a slower rate of convergence for e(t), and prove that our 
condition is sufficient to yield the strong law property (Theorem 5.2.1). In other 
words, we obtain a sufficient condition for the empirical distribution of plays to 
converge to KMR's limit distribution fi* almost surely. This shows that urider 
our condition, KMR's limit distribution fi* describes exactly the portion of time 
that the system spends on each state. 
Our result complements those of Robles (1998) and Pak (2008), showing that 
for a time-inhomogeneous model, the predictions of KMR's long-run distribution 
are accurate when the mutation rate converges to zero slowly enough. 
5.1 Model 
Following Pak (2008), we adapt Ellison's (2000) generalized version of KMR's 
evolutionary model as follows: 
Definit ion 5.1.1 (Cf. Ellison, 2000; Pak, 2008) A homogeneous model of 
evolution is a tuple M = (5 , P , {P{e)}eeio,e]:C, {fss'}s,s'es, {kss'}s,s'es) where 
1. S is a finite state space, 
2. P is a Markov transition matri'x on S, 
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3. each P{e) is a strictly positive Markov transition matrix on 
4- liirie—oP⑷=P, and 
5. c : S X S Z+ U {+00} is a cost function, each fss' • [ 0 ， 司 R is a 
Lipschitz function and each kss' > 0 is a constant such that 
尸 ⑷ 一 , + / 遍 ’ (5.1) 
and fss'(£) —> 0 as e 0. 
Since we are interested in the dynamic behavior of the system when the muta -
tion ra te is t ime-dependent , we adapt Pak ' s (2008) version of the inhomogeneous 
model of evolution as follows: 
D e f i n i t i o n 5 . 1 . 2 (Cf . P a k , 2008 ) An inhomogeneous model of evolution is a 
tuple M. = (•M, {e(t)}tez++)，where M is a homogeneous model of evolution as 
given in Definition 5.1.1, and {e(t)}拓？:s a sequence of mutation rates such 
that each e � G (0’司，and e(f) 0 as t ^  00. The model M defines a time-
inhomogeneous Markov process on S, with the sequence of transition matrices 
Recall t h a t Pak ' s (2008) result requires t he sequence of muta t ion r a t e {e{t)} 
t o satisfy the following two conditions: 
a) = and (S) 
00 
b) ；^(e(力+ 1 ) - e � ) + < o o , (C) 
t=i 
arid he ob ta ins 
1 Ellison (2000) and Pak (2008) assume that each P{£) is ergodic. We employ a positivity 
assumption for simplicity, but there is no essential difference. 
2 Our definition differs from that of Pak (2008) in that we count t from 1 instead of 0. This is 
only for the sake of simplicity in the empirical distribution, and there is no essential difference. 
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(Strong-Ergodicity Property) For any t, 
lim ||P“,）-Q*||oc = 0. (E) 
t'-*oo 
Hence, Theorem 4.3.1 can be rephrased as follows: 
Fact 5 . 1 . 1 For any inhomogeneous model of evolution M. = {M, {e{t)}t£z++), 
if {€{t)}t^z++ satisfies (S) and (C), then (E) holds. 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, the Strong-Ergodicity Property (E) is equivalent 
to for any t and any initial distribution /io, 
J^r = lim (E') 
t'-*oo 
which can be viewed as the tirne-inhornogeneous version of the Ergodicity Prop-
erty (2.3). This motivates us to seek whether Pak's (2008) condition ((S) and 
(C)) is also sufficient for the time-inhomogeneous model to have the property 
of strong law of large numbers like (2.4). We find that in order to have such 
property, we need to strengthen condition (S), requiring {e(t)} to converge to 
zero more slowly. In the following section, we will provide a sufficient condition 
for the empirical distribution to converge to KMR's limit distribution fi* almost 
surely, which is also the main result of this thesis. 
5.2 Convergence of Empirical Distribution 
We are interested in the convergence of empirical distribution. Recall that for 
each t, we denote st as the state in period t. Denote ht — (sr)r<t as the histories 
up to period t. Let Zt G A(S') be the empirical distribution of the plays up to 
period t. That is, for every s G 5, 2:4(5) = j | { r < t : Sr = Then, Zt{s) is the 
relative frequency with which s has occurred in the first t periods. 
3 I J | denotes the number of elements in a finite set J. 
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We seek a condition that is sufficient for the inhomogeneous model M to 
satisfy the following property of the strong law of large numbers: 
(Strong-Law Property) For any initial state Sq, 
Zt —> II* almost surely as t —> oo. (L) 
To obtain (L), we need to strengthen condition (S), requiring {e{t)} to con-
verge to zero more slowly as follows: 
e{t) = Q ( r ^ ) , for some 0 < cr < 1/2. (SS) 
Our main result is: 
T h e o r e m 5 . 2 . 1 For any inhomogeneous model of evolution M — {M, {e{t)}tez++), 
if {e(t)}tez++ satisfies (SS) and (C), then (L) holds. 
Hence, we obtain a sufficient condition for the empirical distribution of plays 
to converge almost surely, and the limit that it converges to is KMR's long-run 
distribution fi*. This shows that under our condition, KMR's long-run distri-
bution fi* describes exactly the portion of time that the system spends on each 
state.4 
Our proof of Theorem 5.2.1 uses the following well-known strong law of large 
rmiTibers for dependent random variables (cf. Loeve, 1978, p.53; Hart and Mas-
Colell, 2000, p.1149):5’6 
4 By Theorem 5.2.1’ (SS)+(C)=^>(L). At the same time, (SS)+(C)=>(S)+(C)=>(E) by Fact 
5.1.1. We did not investigate the logical relationship between (L) and (E), i.e., whether (L)=4>(E) 
or (E)=^L) or both or neither. It is an open problem to us. We plan to investigate the logical 
relationship in the future. 
5 We follow the lines of the proof of the Main Theorem in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000), which 
establishes the fact that for a normal form game, if the agents use a certain adaptive procedure, 
then the empirical distribution of plays converges almost surely to the set of correlated equilib-
ria. We modify their proof by replacing the role of the adaptive procedure with an evolutionary 
process and by replacing the set of correlated equilibria with KMR's limit distribution /j,*. 
6 We need a < \/2. Otherwise, (5.35) in the proof of Claim 2 breaks down, and we cannot 
use Fact 5.2.2 to prove Theorem 5.2.1. 
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Fact 5.2.2 (Strong Law of Large Numbers for Dependent Random Vari-
a b l e s ) Let Xn be a sequence of random variables and bn be a sequence of real 
numbers increasing to oo, such that the series XI二i converges. Then 
1 ^ 
— y jXi — E[Xi\Xi,...，Xi^i]] —> 0 almost surely as n oo. (5.2) 
b 几 1=1 
Proof of Theorem 5.2.1 Consider a multi-period recursion where a large 
"block" of periods, from t to t + v, is combined. Both t and v are carefully 
chosen; in particular, t and v go to infinity, but v is relatively small compared to 
t. 
For any t, define 
Pt ：= (5.3) 
We want to prove that —> 0 a.s. as t oo. 
(Step 1: We provide upper bounds on several terms that occur in pt.) For any-
positive integers t and v, define 
v'{s) •=\{t<T <t-\-v:Sr = s}\ and v' := {v'{s))ses- (5.4) 
We make the following claims (whose proofs are given in Section 5.3.1): 
• Claim 1(a): {t + v)^pt+v < t^pt + 0(tv + v'^). 
• Claim 1(b): E[(t + vfpt+y\ht] < fpt + 2tvy/Wi\\lE{v'\ht) — + 0{v^). 
• Claim 1(c): l l g K W — — Q l l o o . 
• Claim 1(d): There exists a number M > 0 such that for any t and w with 
||p(,.’^Hz,) — � < 2《尸(计：M+-)) + MGt + M H u 
CHAPTER 5. Tim e-Dep en den t Mutations and Empirical Distribution 33 
where G, E 工 + i k ( j . ) - e ( j + l ) | ’ and H, := sup,.>, e{j). (As Hj)-
e{j + 1)1 < DO, we have liinf_oo Gt = 0. Also, as l i m “ o o e � = 0 ， w e have 
limf—oo Ht = 0.) 
(Step 2: We select a subsequence and obtain the convergence.) For each 
n = 1, 2，...，define 
tn '.='几2 and Vn •= tn+i — tn = 2n + 1. (5.5) 
We will prove that 
ptn —^  0 a.s. as n —> oo. (5.6) 
We require the following claim (whose proof is given in Section 5.3.2): 
• Claim 2: ^ J2i<n ^i^tuv,, 0 as n oo, 
where 1 1 = 2 尸(‘+丄’‘+“)). 
We apply the Strong Law (Fact 5.2.2) to prove (5.6). First, we put t = tn ••= n^, 
V = Vn ：= tn+1 - tn = 2n + 1，K ：二 tl = u'^ and X^ := b^Pu — K-iPtn—i = 
tlpt^ - By Claim 1(a), we have \Xn+i\ < 0{tnVn + vl) = O(n^), and 
thus E n y ^ r { X n ) / b l = Z n O { n V n ' ) = E n O { l / n ^ ) < oo. By Claim 1(b), we 
have 
A X > ( X , | X i， . . . ’ 1 ) = 去 ^ — A^ *" + i • � ? ) . 
〜 K n Kn 灼 、 K n 
(5.7) 
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As shown below, we have 
— O a s n —oo. (5.8) 
K n 
Since (l/6„) = p tn�by the Strong Law (Fact 5.2.2), we obtain pt^ — 0 
a.s. as n —^  oo. 
It remains for us to establish (5.8). Since ( l / t^) YA<n 0{vf) = ( l /n^) Y.i<n 0(2^+ 
1)2 = 0 ( l / n ) 0 as n —> oo / from (5.7), it suffices to show that 
1 * 1 1 0 as n — oo. (5.9) 
tn Kn 叫 
By Claims 1(c) and 1(d), we have 
- Mil “一’一 -們 l o o 
1 VI Vl VI 
S 土[2 + 2 Z + Gu + Ht] (5.10) 
叫 w=2 w=2 w=2 
1 巧 
< —[2 + …+1 山 +⑷）+ MviiGt, + HtJ] 
約 w=2 
= i + , + + 丑J] • 
Therefore, 
- < 去 例 i [ 2 + 2Kti,”i + M < G t i + 
tn Kn 灼 、 K n 灼 
< + + M(Gt, + Ht,)]. 
“l<n l<n 
(5.11) 
As n oo, the first term on the right-hand side of (5.11) goes to 0 by Claim 2. 
The second term also goes to 0 because 艺i+X]/<n 灼=^n and 2/vi+M(Gti+Hti) 
7 Note that Yl?=i P = 0(nA+i) for A — —1. 
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0 as Z 一 00.8 
Therefore, we have established (5.9), and also (5.8). 
(Step 3: We prove the convergence of {zt}-) We now prove that 
Zt — fi* a.s. as t oo. (5.12) 
First, by (5.6), we have 
2“ n* a.s. as n — oo. (5.13) 
Next, for any t and v, we have ® 
= -ZtW 
^ (5.14) 
= II ZtW < \/m. 
Hence, for tn <t < 
Ikt - 么 I I < O(^) — 0 腦 oo. (5.15) 
Cn+l 
Therefore, (5.12) follows. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.1. 
Q.E.D. 
5.3 Proofs of Claims 
This section is devoted to the proofs of claims used in the proof of Theorem 5.2.1. 
~ 8 To see that E / < n +丑t,)] 0 as n -> oo, first let Fi := 2/vi + M{Gt, + 丑J. 
Because F； 0 as / oo, we have for any e > 0，there exists n* such that Fi < e for all 
1 > n*. Then, for all n > n\ we have T.i<ni^i/in)Fi = Y:ti\viltn)Fi^ + < 
maxis,STi*-i{Ff}EL�i(^;//�7i) + As n ^ oo, E r = ] " i ( 明 — • and 
Er=n-{-^i/in) 1. Thus, we have shown that Y.i<n + + /it,)] — 0 as n — oo. 
9 Please refer to (5.16) in Proof of Claim 1(a) in Section 5.3.1. 
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5.3.1 Proofs of Claims l(a)-(d) 
Proof of Claim 1(a). For each s e S, 
^t+v(s) 二 <t-{-V:Sr = s}\ 
=TT-Tl-t^ <t:Sr = 5 } | + + (5 .16 ) 
t V t t -{- V 
= I H 咖 + 彻 ’ 
where v'{s) \{t < t < t v : Sr = s}| < v. So, Zt+v = j^^t + j^v' and 
Pt+v = \\^t+v — M*lP 
t^ I, * | | 2 2tv , *、 ,v' *、 y' 
"丨丨 + - " ) • (7 - , ) + ！ ^ 丨 丨 厂 " " ， 
(5.17) 
which implies [t + vfpt+, < t^Pt + 2tv\\zt — . - + v^i — mIP- As 
0 < ^ < 1 and 0 < ii*(s) < 1, we have - 1 < - "*)(s) < 1, and hence 
II苦-fi*\\ < 11(1,1,..., 1)11 = y/m. Similarly, \\zt - < V ^ - Therefore, we 
obta in {t + v)^pt+v < f^Pt + 2tvm + v'^m = t'^pt + 0(tv + v'^). 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 1(b). Taking the conditional expectation given the history ht 
on pt+v in (5.17) (so pt and Zt are known) yields 
E[it + vfpt+M = t^Pt + 2tv{zt — //) • {^E(v'\ht) - "*) + v'\\^E(v'\ht) - "*||2 
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P r o o f of Claim 1(c). As m = |5*|’ we may denote S = {1, 2 , . . . , m}. Given ht, 
St = k for some l<k< rri. Then, lE{v'\ht)-ii* = ^ [ : = i ( / c - t h row of 尸叫 ) -
Note that \\k-th row of P ( « ’ , +切）— < — and in finite-
dimensional vector space, || • || and || • ||i are equivalent.u Hence, 
Mil Mill 
1 ^ 
= I I - y " ( k - t h row of — "*)||i 
V 
1 ” (5.19) 
< llk-th row of P(力，— //111 
V “~‘ 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 1(d).^^ For the inhomogeneous Markov process {P(e{t))}tez++, 
we denote Qt as the constant matrix in which each row is the unique invariant 
distribution 師）of 尸(e�).Using triangle inequality and the fact that = 
尸(亡，亡(计 1’广+…，we have, for any t and w with w > 2， 
- < (⑷抖叫）—Qt+i>P('+i，'+""')||oo 
(5.20) 
+ IIQm尸(…’仔—Qi+n,-illoo + � - 1 - Qlloo. 
We first consider the middle term on the right-hand side of (5.20). Note that 
Q⑷ 杆2) 二 Q m ’i3 we have 
Q⑷户(…，m^ ) = Q计1尸(m抖no 
=QmP('+2，'+") - Qt+2P('+2’'+") + Q,+2P('+2’'+") (5.21) 
二 似+1 - Q计2)尸(,+2抖…+ 
10 By the definitions of || . ||i and || • ||oo. 
11 In particular, ||,u|| < ||'u||i < y/fE\\u\l Vw e W . 
12 This proof mainly follows the lines of the proof of Theorem V.4.3 in Isaacson and Madsen 
(1976, p.160-163). We present it here for the readers' convenience. 
13 Because Aie(t+i) is an invariant distribution of p(t+i，(+2). 
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Repeat this procedure on Qt+2P(力+2，,+and continue the process until the last 
term is Again, note that Qi+叨(计比—1’计比）=Qt+w-i, we 
have 
t+w-2 
…’计二 Y^ (Qj - Q 州 ) P ( 州 抖 + Q 一 . (5.22) 
j=t+i 
Hence, using triangle inequality, we obtain 
t+w-2 
| |G+lP(H_l’t+…—Q计’ill� S [ " ( 仏 — 込 I I … 
j=t+l 
t+w-2 
< E IIQ； — ft+lllooM 尸(州抖")） 
绅 （5.23) 
t+w-2 � ‘ 




Next, considering the first term on the right-hand side of (5.20), 




< 抖 ’ + ^ (5.25) 
j=t+i 
As proven by Pak (2008, p.663-664), the mapping € /i^ is Lipschitz con-
tinuous on [0,e], so there exists M > 0 such that {fi^  — / v | < M|e — e'| for all 
e’e' G [0，司.Then, 
00 
II尸("+切）—g^lloo < (奸 1’'+叨)）+ — e{j + 1)1 + Me{t -\-w~l) 
j=t+i 
< 2(5(P(计 1’绅⑷）+ MGt + M H f 
(5.18) 
Q.E.D. 
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5.3.2 Proof of Claim 2 
To prove Claim 2, we require the following Claim 3, which provides an upper 
bound on the term Kt,v 
C l a i m 3: There exists an integer L and a constant C such that, for any t and v 
with v>2L + l, 
Proof of Claim 3. Along with Pak (2008), but we choose e(t) = with 
0 < cr < 1/2. As stated in the proof of Lemma 3.5 in Pak (2008), there exists an 
integer L and a constant C such that as /c —> oo, 
> C ( - 1 ) . (5.27) 
K 
Now, consider any t and w where w > 2L 1. Then, there exists some integer k 
such that t + l<kL<(k-\-l)L<t-^ w. Therefore, 
< ^p(f+l’fcL))^p(A;L’(fc+l)ZO)Wp((fc+l)L’<+uO) 
<�p(fcL，( fc+l )L)) 
< ! - < ) ( 5 . 2 8 ) 
Similarly, if w > JL + 1 for some integer J > 2, then there exists some integer k 
such that it + 1 S /cL ：^  (/c + 1)L S • • • S (/c + J — S 力 + w. Hence, 
< n f c i j i — < [ 1 - ( 5 . 2 9 ) 
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For V > 2L + 1, let J' be the greatest integer J with JL < v. Theii,^'^ 
2L 3L 4L 
/(，，= 二(5(尸(计1州")）+ J] 抖-))+ ^ vp(m，m^ )) 
w=2 W=2L+\ W^2,L+\ 
J'L V 
W={J'-\)L+I W=J'L+I (5 30) 
+ … + _ + (” — J'L) 
< (2L - 1) + L(r + 7*2 + …+ + L, 
where r 1 - C[L!{t + v)Y. As 0 < r < 1, we have 
Kt,v < (2L - 1) + L - ^ + L < (3L - 1) + L - ^ 
1 - r (5.31) 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 2. We want to prove that 
^ ^ tiKt,,vi 0 as n oo. (5.32) 
、Kn 
By Claim 3’ /(<“切 < ( 3 L - 1 ) + ( L 击 + ” , ) � . Hence, to show (5.32), it suffices 
to show that 
i ^ ti{ti + viY 一 0 as n — oo. (5.33) 
、 K n 
As ti = J? and vi = 2l + 1, we have 
n - l 
Kn 1=1 
� I �傘 (5.34) 
‘ ( … 产 + 3 
14 T h e term E2=J>L+I …）vanishes w h e n J'L = v. 
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Therefore, 
1 ^ 1 (n 4- 1)2(7+3 
^ E 协'+ ” ^ 2a + 3 J — — ^ 0 as n —⑴， （5.35) 
“l<n 




In Chapter 5, we have proven that for a time-inhomogeneous model to have the 
Strong-Law Property (L), the sequence of mutation rate {e(i)} needs to converge 
to zero as slowly as in condition (SS), which is more slowly than in Pak's (2008) 
condition (S). However, we still do not know whether Pak's (2008) condition is 
sufficient for the time-inhomogeneous model to have such property or not. We 
do not have any counter example, and the problem is still open to us. We have 
done some preliminary investigations on the open problem. In particular, we 
have attempted some simulations. We hope that this will give us some insights. 
In this chapter, we will present some of our numerical results. Section 6.1 gives 
the numerical example that is used in our simulations. The numerical results will 
be presented in Section 6.2. Based on our observations, we suspect that Pak's 
(2008) condition ((S) and (C)), although sufficient for the time-inhomogeneous 
model to satisfy the Strong-Ergodicity Property (E) (Fact 5.1.1), is not sufficient 
for the model to have the Strong-Law Property (L). Section 6.3 gives discussions 
on some other open problems. 
42 
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6.1 Numerical Example and Simulations 
We now give our model for numerical study. Consider the homogeneous model 
of evolution M - (S, P , where S = {AA, AB, BA, BB},' 
/ I yL4 /IB B A BB \ 
_ ~ Z 4 i 0 0 
P = AB Q 0 1 0 
By^ 0 1 0 0 
\ B B 0 0 0 1 / 
and 
/ AA AB ^ BB \ 
AA ？ ？ i 
P(s) = AB £2 e 1-e-2s'' s: . 
B A e 1 —2£ —£2 £2 e 
\ BB £3 £ 1 —卜一 —一乂 
The absorbing sets of P are {^4^}, {AB, BA} and [BB]. The unique invariant 
distribution of P(e) is 
—(1 — - 1 + 卜 2 £ 2 — 3 £ 4 — 1 — 2 £ 2 一 3 £ 4’ 2 — £ 一 2 £ 2 — 2 ^ 3 — 
5 - 6^2 - — 9s4 一 £5 • 
Hence, by taking £ — 0，we have KMR's long-run distribution 
H* -.= lim/ie = (0.2，0.2，0.2,0.4). 
£一0 
To study time-dependent mutations, we calculate the coradii of absorbing sets 
under P � ’ which are 
CR{{AA}) = CR{{AB,BA}) = 2 > 1 = CR({BB}). 
Therefore, the minimum coradius is 1. Moreover, = a{{BB}) = 0 and 
a{{AB, BA}) > 0. Hence, 
7 := mmCR({s}) + a{{s}) = CR({BB}) + a{{BB}) = 1. 
1 Cf. Pak, 2008, Example 3.4. 
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We consider mutation rates in the form of 
明=(丄广 fort = l ’ 2 , . . . . 
Then M = ( • M ，庄 Z + + ) is an inhomogeneous model of evolution. By The-
orem 5.2.1，we have for any a G (0,1/2), the empirical distribution Zt converges 
to KMR's long-run distribution [i* almost surely as 亡—oo, i.e., \\zt — 0 
almost surely as t ^ oo. We simulate the time-inhomogeneous evolutionary pro-
cess with different values of a, and calculate zt and \\zt — up to ^ = 10®. The 
result thus obtained will be presented in the next section.2 
6.2 Numerical Results 
We have simulated the time-inhomogeneous evolutionary process for different 
values of a. Recall that for any a G (0,1/2), \\zt - /i*|| — 0 almost surely as 
t ^ oo. We first simulate the evolutionary process for (j = 1/3 to study the 
time-series pattern of \\zt — fi*\\ for almost sure convergence. Then, we compare 
the pattern with those generated with other values of a. 
Figure 6.1 shows the time-series pattern of \\zt — for o•二 1/3. We observe 
that \\zt, - is generally decreasing to zero with high frequency of oscillations. 
The last period's empirical distribution is ^loe = (0.2023,0.2032,0.2002,0.3942), 
and the norm of the difference between the last period empirical distribution ZIQG 
and KMR's long-run distribution n* is ||zio6 — = 0.0070, which is less than 
1%. 
For cr 二 1, {e(t)} satisfies (S) and (C). Thus, by Fact 5.1.1, the Markov chain 
induced by the time-inhomogeneous model M is strongly ergodic. However, as 
we can see from Figure 6.2, the time-series pattern of \\zt — is quite different 
2 Extending the time period to larger than 10® requires a very high computational capac-
ity (e.g. memory). In the future, we will simulate examples with longer time periods using 
computers with higher computational capacity. 
CHAPTER 6. Open Problems 45 





1�-1. W �A 
_ f M / V , 
1 I \ 
10_3 I I 1 I 1 I I .~~_ ‘ • I ••• 
1 0 � 10' 10^ 1 0 ' 1 0 ' 10® 10® 
t 
Figure 6.1: \\zt - /i*|| against t for a = 1/3 
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Figure 6.2: \\zt - /i*|| against ；t for cr = 1 
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<1口1 , n'^IO® , err=0 6715 � 0:1/1.5. n=10® . err=0.0469 
10， \ \ 
\ A 一. V a . , v � \ a, 
� - f^i \ • ^ i i I 
1 � . � � i . 1�-'. 
li i 
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0»l/2. n=10® , err=0.0238 <j=1/3 . n=10® . err=0.0070 
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I 1 
Figure 6.3: \\zt — against t for different d's 
from that in Figure 6.1. It is much smoother and we cannot see there is any 
tendency for \\zt — to decrease to zero. Hence, we suspect that Pak's (2008) 
condition ((S) and (C)), although sufficient for the time-inhomogeneous model to 
satisfy the Strong-Ergodicity Property (E) (Fact 5.1.1), is not sufficient for the 
model to have the Strong-Law Property (L). 
We have also studied the cases where a = 1/1.5 and a 二 1/2. The result is 
shown in Figure 6.3. We observe that the time-series patterns of \\zt — /i*|| are 
similar to that in Figure 6.1 for these two values of a. They both decrease with 
high frequency of oscillations and have the tendency to decrease to zero. We also 
observe that when a is smaller, the decline is generally faster, which is consistent 
to our proof (see (5.35) in Section 5.3.2). 
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As there is a tendency for \\zt - to decrease to zero for a = 1/1.5, it is 
possible that our bound on a (i.e., a < 1/2) is not tight. The bound on a should 
be further investigated in the future. 
With this numerical study, we suspect that 
(i) Pak's (2008) condition ((S) and (C)), although sufficient for the time-
inhomogeneous model to satisfy the Strong-Ergodicity Property (E) (Fact 
5.1.1)，is not sufficient for the model to have the Strong-Law Property (L); 
and 
(ii) our bound on a (i.e., a < 1/2) is not tight. 
We hope to obtain theoretical results in future research. 
6.3 Other Discussions 
We have obtained a sufficient condition for (L). One might naturally ask to find 
a necessary condition for (L). To be more specific, one might assume condition 
(C) and consider {e{t)} to have our form of e{t) = ^ ( f f ) , and ask what range 
of a is necessary for the inhomogeneous model M to satisfy (L). It is an open 
problem to us, but we suspect that cr cannot be too large. 
Suppose a is very large, then e{t) converges to zero very fast. After some fixed 
time periods, the inhomogeneous system would be very similar to a homogeneous 
system with transitional matrix P(0), which is in general not ergo die and so 
might have multiple invariant distributions. It seems that (L) would fail. This is 
just a rough idea and we do not have any concrete examples. 
Also, as mentioned in footnote 4 in Chapter 5, the logical relationship between 
(L) and (E) is open to us. We plan to investigate it in the future. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we study an evolutionary model with stochastic stability of KMR 
with time-dependent mutations. We first review the concept of stochastic stabil-
ity clue to KMR, whose approach assumes time-independent mutations, together 
with some of its applications and variations. We are interested in one of the vari-
ations —time-dependent mutations — studied by Robles (1998) and Pak (2008). 
Pak (2008) finds a sufficient condition on the rate of convergence of the mutation 
parameter for ergodicity. 
Different from Robles (1998) and Pak (2008), whose focus is on the conver-
gence of transitional matrices, we study the convergence of empirical distribution 
of plays. We provide a condition on the rate of convergence for the mutation pa-
rameter, which is sufficient for the empirical distribution to converge to KMR's 
long-run distribution almost surely (Theorem 5.2.1). Our result complements 
Pak's (2008) ergodicity results, showing that when the mutation parameter con-
verges to zero slowly enough, KMR's long-run distribution describes not only 
the probability distribution over the states but also the portion of time that the 
system spends on each state. 
While our bound on the rate of convergence of the mutation parameter (SS) is 
tighter than that under Pak's (2008) condition (S), we do not know whether our 
bound is tight. It is still an open problem. Further investigation on this bound 
48 
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should be carried out in the future. 
Bibliography 
1] Agastya, M. (2004), Stochastic Stability in a Double Auction, Games and 
Economic Behavior, 48, 203-222. 
2] Anderlini, L., and A. lanni (1996), Path Dependence and Learning from 
Neighbors, Games and Economic Behavior, 13, 141-177. 
.3] Bergin, J., and B. L. Lipman (1996), Evolution with State-Dependent Muta-
tions, Ecoriometrica, 64, 943-956. 
'4] Birirnore, K. (1987), Modeling Rational Players, /, Economics and Philoso-
phy, 3’ 179-214. 
[5] Biiimore, K. (1988), Modeling Rational Players, // , Economics and Philoso-
phy, 4，9-55. 
6] Blume, A., and T. Ternzelides (2003), On the Geography of Conventions, 
Economic Theory, 22, 863-873. 
7] van Damme, E. (1987), Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag. 
[8] Ellison, G. (2000), Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and 
the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution, Review of Economic Studies, 67, 17-45. 
9] Foster, D.’ and R. Vohra (1997), Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equi-
librium, Games and Economic Behavior, 21, 40-55. 
50 
51 
10] Foster, D.，and R. Vohra (1998), Asymptotic Calibration, Biornetrika, 85, 
379-390. 
11] Foster, D., and R. Vohra (1999), Regret in the On-line Decision Problem, 
Games and Economic Behavior, 29, 7-35. 
12] Foster, D.，and P. Young (1990), Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics, 
Theoretical Population Biology, 38, 219-232. 
13] Preidlin, M. I., and A. D. Wentzell (1984), Random Perturbations of Dy-
namical Systems, New York: Springer-Verlag. 
14] Fudeiiberg, D., and D. M. Kreps (1993)，Learning Mixed Equilibria, Games 
and Economic Behavior, 5, 320-367. 
15] Fiidenberg, D.，and D. K. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games, 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
16] Fudenberg, D., and D. K. Levine (1999), Conditiojial Universal Consistency, 
Games and Economic Behavior, 29, 104-130. 
17] Gale, D.，and L. S. Sliapley (1962), College Admissions and the Stability of 
Marriage, The American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15. 
[18] Harsanyi, J. C., and R. Selten (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium 
Selection in Games, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
[19] Ha r t , S., and A. Mas-Colell (2000), A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to 
Correlated Equilibrium, Econometrica, 68, 1127-1150. 
[20] Isaacson, D. L., and R. W. Madsen (1976), Markov Chains: Theory and 
Applications, New York: Wiley. 
52 
21] Jackson, M. 0,，and A. Watts (2002), The Evolution of Social and Economic 
Networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 106, 265-295. 
22] Kandori, M.，G. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993), Learning, Mutation, and Long 
Run Equilibria in Games, Econometrica, 61, 29-56. 
23] Kandori , M.’ and R. Rob (1995), Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A 
General Theory and Applications, Journal of Economic Theory, 65, 383-414. 
:24j Loeve, M. (1978), Probability Theory, Vol. // , 4th edition, New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
25] Maynard Smith, J., and G. R. Price (1973), The Logic of Animal Conflict, 
Nature, 246, 15-18. 
26] Myerson, R. B. (1978), Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept, Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 7，73-80. 
[27] Nash, J. (1951), Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286-
295. 
28] von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
[29] Pak , M. (2008), Stochastic Stability and Time-Dependent Mutations, Games 
and Economic Behavior, 64, 650-665. 
[30] Robles, J . (1998), Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates, Journa l of Eco-
nomic Theory, 79, 207-223. 
[31] Robson, A. J., and F. Vega-Redondo (1996), Efficient Equilibrium Selection 
in Evolutionai-y Games with Random Matching, Journa l of Economic Theory, 
70, 65-92. 
53 
[32] Selten, R. (1975), Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium 
Points in Extensive Games, International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25-55. 
33] Seneta , E. (1981), Non-Negative Matrices and Markov Chains, 2nd edition, 
New York: Springer-Verlag. 
34] Vega-Redondo, F. (1997), The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior, Economet-
i-ica, 65, 375-384. 
35] Young, H. P. (1993), The Evolution of Conventions, Econometrica, 61, 57-84. 
[36] Young, H. P. (2004), Strategic Learning and Its Limits, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
I 
• j . - ： .、： - ： ； .... - • . • • • • • • .^ ； •••：. 
CUHK Libraries 
timmm 
0 0 4 7 7 9 3 7 3 
